Introduction
The combination of a SISO decoder and Decryptor, which is analyzed in this paper, can be considered as a concatenation of codes: en-/decryptor has the role of an outer en-/decoder and the channel encoder/SISO channel decoder has the role of an inner en-/decoder has (Fig. 1) .
Concatenation of codes, presented as an outer and inner code was already devised by Forney in 1966 [1] . In literature, it is known as concatenated codes [2] , general concatenated codes [3] or super channel codes. The inner code is generally short and decoded with a soft decision decoding algorithm, while the outer code is generally longer and decoded with an algebraic decoding method [2] .
In most cases a convolutional code is used as an inner code in combination with a Reed Solomon code or another convolutional code as an outer code. Such a type of concatenated codes can be compared to the combination of codes investigated in this work (Fig.1) . Two good characteristics are the result of such a concatenated schema: good error performance because of the use of SISO principle and good security performance as the result of the use of the cryptographic mechanisms.
The next common point of this work with previous works in coding is the idea of the use of reliability in decoding. There are several works which explore the reliabilitybased soft-decision decoding algorithms for linear block codes, using the concept of error correction by ordering the decoded bits by their reliability values. The values of soft outputs of the decoder have been used as reliability values.
The idea of inversion of the least probable bits (with the lowest reliability values) originated from Chase decoding algorithms [4] in 1972, which were the generalization of the GMD (Generalized Minimum Distance) algorithms from 1966 [1] . These algorithms have been applied to a binary (n, k) linear block code and are referenced as LRP (Least Reliability Positions) algorithms.
Chase algorithms generate a list of candidate code words by complementing all possible combinations of bits with the lowest reliability values. The candidate with the best metric is the decoded solution.
The similarity to the method of the Soft Input Decryption, is the use of L-values reordered and iteratively tested. The difference is that Soft Input Decryption uses two decoders (inner and outer) and a non-linear block code (cryptographic algorithms). Two codes enable the use of feedback from the outer to inner code.
The next group of algorithms, which use decoding based on ordering of L-values, is a group of MRIP (Most Reliable Independent Positions) -reprocessing decoding algorithms, as the Most Reliable Basis [MRB] , the Least Reliable Basis [LRB] and the Ordered Statistic Decoding Algorithm [2] .
Joint source channel coding is the another topic related to this work. The cooperation between the source and channel decoder enables a better use of information of both decoders and better decoding results [5] . It is based on the turbo -principle, as well as Softbit -Source Decoding [6] and Iterative Source -Channel decoding [7] . The similarity to Soft Input Decryption is the use of iterative information exchange between the two elements of the receiver: channel and source decoder, in case of joint source channel coding, rsp. channel decoder and decryptor in case of Soft Input Decryption. 
Soft Input Decryption Algorithm
Soft Input Decryption [8] is a method for the correction of SID blocks which contain cryptographic check values (digital signatures, MACs, H-MACs) by using L-values as the output of the SISO channel decoder. Cryptographic check values provide data integrity, data origin authentication and non repudiation [9] . Soft Input Decryption works block oriented. The input for Soft Input Decryption contains data which are secured by cryptographic check values. The block which has to be corrected by Soft Input Decryption after channel decoding is called SID block (Soft Input Decryption block). It may contain data and cryptographic check values, or just cryptographic check values, depending on the used scenario (see Section 2.4).
In Fig. 2 the standard verification process without Soft Input Decryption is presented. The algorithm of Soft Input Decryption (Fig. 3 ) is as follows:
The Soft Input Decryption is successfully completed, if the verification of the cryptographic check value is successful, i.e. the output is "true". If the verification is negative, the soft output of the channel decoder is analyzed and the bits with the lowest |L|-values are flipped (XOR 1). Then the decryptor performs the verification process and proves the result of the verification again. If the verification is negative, bits with another combination of the lowest |L|-values are changed. This iterative process will stop when the verification is successful or the needed resources are consumed.
In the case that the attempts for correction fail, the number of modified bits is too large as a result of a very noisy channel, a very long SID block or an attack, so that the resources are not sufficient to find the correct content of a SID block.
It may happen that the attempts for the correction of a SID block succeed, but the content of a SID block is not equal to the original one: a collision happened. This case has a negligible probability if the length of the cryptographic check values are chosen under security aspects (for example, considering the "birthday paradox"). 
Simulations and Results
The chosen length of the SID block is 320 bit. The reason for this length of a SID block is that this is a size of a digital signature based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography over GF (2 160 ) or GF(p) with ld(p) = 160. Further on BPSK modulation, the model of an AWGN channel, as well as a convolutional and a turbo code [10] are used in the simulations. The used convolutional encoder has a code rate r = 1/2 and a constraint length m = 2. The turbo encoder with r = 1/3 is based on two parallel RSC convolutional encoders with r = ½ and a block interleaver of depth 17 [12] . The turbo decoder performs 3 iterations. The decoder (convolutional and turbo) uses a MAP algorithm [11] . The results in Fig. 4 
Strategies of Soft Input Decryption
The module "Changing of bits of SID block" (see Fig. 3 ) contains the strategy, in which sequence bits and combinations of bits of the SID block are changed, before the next verification is achieved. Depending on the strategy of Soft Input Decryption, different schedules of bit correction are possible.
The static strategy of Soft Input Decryption is used for the results of Chapter 3. Proposals for other strategies are also given in this Chapter.
Static Strategy
If the first verification after starting Soft Input Decryption is not successful, the bit with the lowest |L|-value of the SID block is flipped, assuming that the wrong bits are probably those with the lowest |L|-values. If the verification is again not successful, the bit with the second lowest |L|-value is changed. The next try will flip the bits with the lowest and second lowest |L|-value, then the bit with the third lowest |L|-value, etc. The process is limited by the number of bits with the lowest |L|-values, which should be tested. The strategy follows a representation of an increasing binary counter, whereby the lowest bit corresponds to the bit with the lowest |L|-value, etc.
The strategy is defined by following algorithm.
The static strategy orders the bits of the SID block by their |L|-values starting with the lowest one and monotonly increasing. The output of the sort algorithm is represented as an example in Fig. 6 . j is the increasing sequence of positions of |L|-values and P j indicates the position of the bit with the j th lowest |L|-value in the original SID block. The length of the SID block is w. The sorted sequence P j can be limited to P Nmax . i is reset to 0 at the beginning of Soft input Decryption. The strategy is based on the following assumption: if bits are wrong decoded by the channel decoder, than they have the lowest |L|-values. Unfortunately, this assumption is not true, because L-values are probability based and give only an orientation which bits may be wrong decoded. It may happen, for example, that combinations of up to 7 bits have to be tested, when only 3 bits are wrong.
Dynamic Strategy
The static strategy sorts the L-values of single bits. The dynamic strategy calculates the L-values of groups of bits to decide which trial should be performed next. It can happen, that a group of bits result in a lower |L|-value than a |L|-value of a single bit, i.e. that a specific group of bits is probably wrong. By this way, it is possible to find the group of wrong bits in only a few trials, not testing all combinations of flipped bits untill the bits untill the right combination is found like in the static strategy. The calculation is based on use of the L algebra [12] and much more complex than the static strategy. The elaboration of the dynamic strategy is for further study.
BER Based Strategy
The BER based strategy analyses, which number of errors is the most probable in the SID block, under consideration of 
Application Scenarios

Scenario 1
In scenario 1 (Fig. 7) digital signatures giving message recovery are used [13] . In this type of digital signatures the digital signature is not appended to the message, but contains the message, practically the digital signature replaces the message.
If the verification process is successful, the message is also correctly recovered. The length of the message including redundancy is limited by the size of the underlying mathematical structure of the used asymmetric cryptography. For example, the length has to be shorter than 1024 bits, if RSA is used with a length of the modulus of 1024 bits, or shorter than 160 bits, if ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) is used over GF (2 160 ). Algorithms can be found in [13] and [14] .
This scenario can be often found in transaction oriented applications exchanging short messages, which have to be authentic. Typical examples are measurement values in industrial metering systems (electricity, water, gas etc.), data generated by sensors, as well as stock exchange rates. 
Scenario 2
Scenario 2 (Fig. 8) considers signatures with appendix [15] . Messages signed by signatures with appendix have arbitrary lengths, but Soft Input Decryption can only be applied to SID blocks of limited lengths (Note: the application of a collision free one-way hash function is considered here to be part of the signature generation and verification process). In this scenario, it is assumed that the message and the signature are transmitted separately and the SID block consists only of the signature: the message is transmitted via a communication channel different from the one used for the transmission of the digital signature (outband), or via the same communication channel (inband). The message itself is transmitted first and -if modified during transmissioncorrected by redundancy within the message, by repetition or by agreement of the communication partners. So, it is assumed that finally the message is received correctly by the receiver. The digital signature is transmitted afterwards, either when it is generated on request or when the action described by the message should be executed.
Typical examples are legal contracts or bank transactions, which are prepared in advance, and the digital signature is transmitted at the requested moment. If an error occurs during the signature verification, the signature is not correct: it has been manipulated or errors occurred during the transmission, which can not be corrected by the channel decoder.
In this case, the Soft Input Decryption block consists of one signature block used for verification of the message. 
Scenario 3
Scenario 3 (Fig. 9) is the most general scenario and considers messages with a cryptographic check value: MAC [16] , H-MAC [17] or digital signatures with appendix.
In this case, the SID block consists of a message extended by a cryptographic check value.
Typical examples are credit/debit applications and other bank applications. 
Performance aspects of L-values
The number of L-values required for correction
If the performance of Soft Input Decryption should be estimated, at first it is necessary to consider the reliability of the soft input. 
The theoretical minimum needed for correction
The problem is that reliability values themselves are not reliable. So, the question arises, which is the number of errors in a SID block, which is the lower limit of L-values to be used by Soft Input Decryption.
The probability P w,i , that a code word of length w -in this case a SID block -contains i errors is:
where p represents BER. Soft Input Decryption tests all possible combinations of up to N max L-values. The probability P w that, after correction by Soft Input Decryption, only errors which are longer than N max will not be corrected is [18] :
Soft Input Decryption corrects the data received from channel decoding. Therefore p means the bit error rate after the channel decoder. p depends on the quality of a MAP decoder.
In the case of 95 % corrected SID blocks, P w = 0.05. N max is calculated for the correction of more than 95 % errors has been done for lengths of SID blocks of w = {128, 160, 320, 384} bits (Fig. 11) .
N max in (5) and (6) means the minimum N max because the case considers the number of L-values for correction of P w wrong bits.
The results are shown in Fig. 11 . The percentage of corrected SID blocks per |L|-value is tested for lengths of 128, 160 and 320 bits and for different E b /N 0 . The results of tests show curves with a negative exponential function of the form (see Fig. 13 ):
Coefficients k and a depend on the length w of the SID block and E b /N 0 . This dependence is derived in this section and then applied for other values.
As the total percentage of corrected SID blocks is 100 % after testing of all L-values, the following condition is valid: Approximations are done using S/N ratio which is easier for calculation. The entries of the first and third row of Table 2 is used for approximation by a second order polynomial:
The calculated coefficients A, B and C are shown in Table  2 for SID blocks of length of 128, 160 and 320 bits. The approximation of the dependence of a on S/N is shown in Fig. 14 
The values of the linear coefficients are shown in Table 3 . Table 1 Coefficients k and a for SID block of w = 128, 160 and 320 bit Using equations (7) and (9), the percentage of corrected bits (indicated as y in (7)) can be calculated as a function of positions of |L|-values (indicated as x in (7)), S/N and the length w of a SID block: If the number x 0 of L-values needed for correction of y(x 0 ) percentage of errors has to be, equation (7) (19) can be trusted and used for further extrapolations.
Equation (19) is now applied for SID blocks of length w = 1024 in Fig. 17 . The length of 1024 bits is chosen for comparison, because RSA signatures with a signature length of 1024 bits offer the same security level as digital signatures based on ECC with the signature length of 320 bits. It may appear attractive to use RSA signatures because the verification time is very short when a public exponent with a low Hamming weight is used.
Assuming E b /N 0 = 3 dB, the number of L-values is 48 compared to 14 when using ECC digital signatures of 320 bit. Therefore, at one hand, it becomes clear, that the use of RSA digital signatures is not suitable for Soft Input Decryption. At the other hand, the application of Soft Input Decryption to longer blocks than 1024 bits is realistic if E b /N 0 is not too low. 
Time Performance
Under practical aspects it is important to consider the consumed resources of Soft Input Decryption, specifically the time needed for the correction of SID blocks. The needed time depends on the cryptographic algorithm and on the number of L-values which are necessary to correct the errors. Therefore the success of Soft Input Decryption is highly dependent on the quality of the soft output of the channel decoder.
The time needed to perform 2 8 verifications of digital signatures of 320 bits with appendix (based on ECDSA) without hash calculation which are not necessary in Scenario 2, MACs (CBC MAC -DES with key size of 56 bit) and H-MACs (SHA-1 with output size of 160 bit) are shown in Table 3 -5. The numbers are based on use of a PC with Pentium 4 of 1.7 and 1.8 GHz [19] .
The second row of the tables shows the number of verifications and consumed time, which is needed for testing and correcting bits with up to the 8 lowest |L|-values. In the case of MAC/H-MAC a new MAC/H-MAC is computed, if the changed bit is in the message part. If the changed bit is in the MAC/H-MAC part, only a comparison to the previously computed MAC/H-MAC is performed, which costs almost no time. It is assumed that the L-values used for correction are equally distributed over the message part and the cryptographic check value.
In the table with the results of digital signatures (Table 3) there is an additional third row which assumes an optimization of the digital signatures verifications (100 times faster verification) following the first verification. The arithmetic of subsequent verifications is much more efficient and faster, if only one bit of the input of the verification is changed compared to one of the preceding verifications because only a single point addition has to be executed for correction. Example: in the case of ECKDSA [13] 
Conclusion and Further Work
In this paper the principles of Soft Input Decryption are presented, as well as results of various simulations. The application of the Soft Input Decryption method is shown using different scenarios. The coding gain of cryptographic check error rates which is more than 2 dB in case of SID blocks of length of 320 bits show that Soft Input Decryption is a promising method which characteristics have to be examined for further use and improvement.
Different strategies for changing of bits are possible, depending on a used system and error distribution. In this paper a static strategy is used, but also other possible strategies as dynamic and BER strategy are mentioned. These and other suggestions for new strategies are for further study. The future work should focus on improvement of arithmetical efficiency of cryptography for Soft Input Decryption to achieve faster verification process in a scope of Soft input Decryption and to prove the assumption used in row 3 of Table 3 .
Section 3.2 more sophisticated strategies of Soft Input Decryption instead of static strategy have been outlined. Further studies will elaborate these strategies and test the performance.
Investigation of Soft Input Decryption should be also applied to standardized turbo codes for 3G, using the fact that the remaining errors after turbo coding are very often grouped (flipping of corresponding groups of bits).
